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Positive Ignorance: 





In an article published in the Journal of Philosophy of Education, Richard Smith (2016) 
proposes and argues for what he calls ‘the virtues of unknowing’. In it, he reads, amongst 
others, Jacques Derrida and Friedrich Nietzsche. He does so in a manner that I will suggest 
could be expanded to further develop his conception of ‘unknowing’. I will claim that further 
readings of both of these philosophers would support a significant expansion of the important 
epistemological and educational claims that Smith makes, and, further, show that such an 
expansion would be true to their thought. This critical development of Smith’s research into 
‘unknowing’ attempts to outline how the process of unknowing might be utilised as a tool for 
education and educational research.  
Central to Smith’s argument is the distinction that he draws between ‘unknowing’ and 
‘not knowing’. He first introduces this distinction as if it was reasonably inconsequential, but 
then develops an argument against not knowing in the name of the virtues of unknowing. I 
will suggest that Smith’s assignation of unknowing as productive or constitutive of virtues, 
especially in the context of the other epistemological virtue he describes (that of a ‘well-
stocked mind’), does not attend substantially enough to the problematic relationship both of 
these philosophers have with understandings of this latter conception. It will be suggested 
that Smith (I think against his intentions), runs the risk of presenting ‘unknowing’ as too 
comfortable with a traditional and conservative pedagogical argument. In outlining the 
significance of this issue and attempting to somewhat rectify it, my own argument will return 
with interest to a distinction Smith makes early in his article. If, instead of following Smith’s 
turn away from ‘not knowing’ to the ‘virtues of unknowing’, we instead focus on offering a 
fuller conceptual elaboration of “not knowing”, in keeping with the philosophical and 
specifically epistemological positions of the philosophers he engages with, his already 
significant contribution to contemporary work in the philosophy of education through the 
development of the idea of ‘unknowing’, could be enhanced. I will, after outlining where 
Smith’s argument leaves us, attempt to take his aborted path in the direction of educational 
thought and research and develop a conception of ‘not knowing’ that challenges some 
aspects of  ‘the virtues of unknowing’ and its concomitant epistemological and ethical 
positions tied to the ‘well-stocked mind’. To do so I will draw from the theoretical conclusions 
of Barbara Johnson’s (1989) essay, ‘Teaching Ignorance: L’Ecole des Femmes’, as well as from 
the work of Linda Martin Alcoff (1996) and Walter Mignolo (2011).  
 
 
Smith’s Defence of Epistemic Virtues 
 
 In ‘The Virtues of Unknowing’, Smith positions his argument for unknowing against 
what he conceives of as a contemporary malaise in epistemological thought. He tells us that 
“it has become common to read of the ‘death of epistemology’’’ (p. 272). He splits the 
surviving virtue epistemologists into two camps: reliabilists, who “focus on what are 
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sometimes called ‘faculty virtues’ such as accurate perception and good memory”, and 
responsibilists, who “emphasise the knower as an active individual who is part of a community 
to which he or she has obligations from which he or she derives norms and examples.” (p. 
274). While Smith positions his own argument on the side of the responsibilists, he 
nonetheless appropriately criticises them as “they too often incline from time to time towards 
the verdictive and an emphasis on truth and knowledge”, this being “all the odder” for Smith 
“since virtue epistemology was born out of a sense that traditional epistemology, which took 
its central task as giving an account of truth and knowledge, had become sterile.” (p. 275). He 
then begins to frame his subsequent argument for unknowing in terms of ‘the quieter 
epistemic virtues’ such as ‘[intellectual] modesty and diffidence’ (p. 275). 
 This introduction makes way for Smith’s major claim, which is that the ‘good knower’ 
or ‘epistemically admirable person, one who stands well with regard to knowledge and 
related goods—may sometimes be one who does not know: whose virtues are those of not 
knowing or […] of unknowing.’ (p. 276). This description, I will argue, is problematic on two 
levels. Firstly, in that the philosophical resources Smith relies upon to support his claim – 
drawing special attention to Nietzsche and Derrida – would support a more nuanced and self-
reflexive conception of unknowing. Second, that this is partly because the unknowing Smith 
describes is, in fact, a form of knowledge (knowing what not to know). It is also important to 
note that, in relation to this second problem, especially given Smith’s contextualisation of his 
paper as a rebuttal of ‘the death of epistemology’, he does not engage with recent work 
produced on epistemologies of ignorance (for prominent, extensive, and wide-ranging edited 
collections of essays see Sullivan & Tuana 2007 and Malewski & Jaramillo 2011, as well as, 
more recently, Santos 2014 and Medina 2013), which could be seen to prefigure and 
problematize the contextualisation and content of his argument. 
Most problematic in terms of my own argument – and partly where my motivation to 
develop it further as a tool for education and educational research comes from – is that Smith 
provides no evidence to justify the ‘strong case’ he would make for ‘that old fashioned virtue, 
the possession of a well-stocked mind […] organised according to a sense of what is worth 
knowing and what is not, and is not thrown together promiscuously or arbitrarily.’ (p. 276). 
This ‘sense of what is worth knowing and what is not’ is not itself conditioned by any self-
reflexive unknowing (a feature central to my development of the idea of unknowing here). 
This might provoke the question: how does one know what it is worth knowing apart from via 
this quasi-mystical ‘sense’? Smith’s sense of ‘what is worth knowing’ is opposed, through 
several of his own examples, to the contextual specificity of knowledge worth having. The 
caveats he provides to this are that the things that are worth knowing ‘change over time and 
vary from culture to culture’, which exhibits the danger of implying (I think against his 
intentions) that everyone who is subject to, for example, ‘Western’ or ‘British culture’, at a 
particular time, should know the same things worth knowing, otherwise their mind would not 
be considered ‘well-stocked’ by Smith’s standards. No doubt, Smith’s conceptions of both 
culture and temporality are far more nuanced than his reference here implies, but in the 
absence of evidence, and because of my position that nuance and complexity are crucial to 
the process of unknowing or not knowing, I will attempt to add to Smith’s argument by 
emphasising them. In the case of my own position, it is just as important to emphasise that 
the absence of a culturally dominant conception of a ‘well-stocked mind’ that I am proposing 
as the next step in the development of Smith’s progressive responsibilism would not imply an 
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individual’s inability to distinguish between what could be individually and/or socially 
considered good or bad actions, as well as good and bad social and cultural norms. This 
development of Smith’s approach is neither relativistic nor nihilistic in terms making 
judgments, it is rather concerned that these judgments are significantly informed by a 
mitigation of the risk of pre-judgment or even prejudice. The notion of ‘unknowing’ I propose 
to develop from Smith’s is a process of unpicking the knowledge we think we have and the 
prejudices that often come along with it. This process attempts also to move the centre of 
gravity, for judgment of what is appropriate to know and not to know, away from individuals 
with a culturally dominant conception of what should stock a mind and act as its own basis 
for judgment; it persistently disconcerts and resists our self-certainties. In the context of 
ethical relation, this centre of gravity does not only move toward those who minds might be 
stocked with other or more contextually applicable ‘content’ than our own but also, as Jack 
Bicker (2018) puts it, towards those, often in non-culturally-dominant positions, who 
“embody and signify difference through the lived substance of their lives” ( pp. 83-84).  
 While Smith’s approach to epistemology, as a quasi-responsibilist, is clearly not 
unresponsive to context, the emphasis he assigns to the derivation of “norms and examples” 
(p. 274) in that school of epistemology, combined with the assertion of the culturally and 
temporally specific possession of a ‘well-stocked mind”, ties down his otherwise progressive 
approach to some of the limitations he already finds in responsibilism (p. 275).  His strong 
case for the ‘possession’ of particular knowledge seems to suggest that his preference for the 
idea of ‘unknowing’ over ‘not knowing’ might be more to do with the fact that ‘unknowing’ is 
a quality or a virtue that one can possess, while it would be impossible to ‘possess’ not 
knowing. Thus, on the one hand, Smith runs the risk of suggesting that he possesses the 
knowledge worth knowing (and he knows it’s worth knowing because of a ‘sense’ he has, or 
perhaps because of its perceived cultural hegemony, manifested in the ‘well-stocked mind’), 
while on the other hand, he might also be seen to possess the virtues associated with 
unknowing. The ‘virtues of unknowing’, on Smith’s account, seem only to refer to knowledge 
that it is, without question, good to not have. One’s knowledge that some knowledge is 
worthless or obstructive is, apparently, his definition of ‘unknowing’. Thus, what Smith 
describes as ‘unknowing’ is, at least in my reading of his evidential anecdotes, the preference 
for some immediate, intuitive or practical knowledge over other knowledge. 
Unknowing is not only, if at all, in post-Nietzschean readings, a quasi-mystical and 
intentionally passive relation to that which one does not know, but rather, and perhaps more 
importantly, a conditioning of one’s own self-assured knowledge, which would of course 
include Smith’s well-stocked mind. This can be deduced even in the passages of The Gay 
Science that Smith cites from. For example, Smith cites a few lines from the third and fourth 
sections of the text (see p. 280) but does not reference a longer and, I would suggest, more 
central passage to the third section wherein Nietzsche (2001) more clearly defines his 
approach:  
 
Only great pain, that long, slow pain that takes its time and in which we are burned, 
as it were, over green wood, forces us philosophers to descend into our ultimate 
depths and put aside all trust, everything good-natured, veiling, mild, average – things 
in which formerly we may have found our humanity. I doubt that such pain makes us 
'better' - but I know that it makes us deeper. Whether we learn to pit our pride, our 
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scorn, our willpower against it, like the savage who, however badly tormented, repays 
his tormentor with the malice of his tongue; or whether we withdraw before pain into 
the Oriental Nothingness - called Nirvana - into mute, rigid, deaf self-surrender, self-
forgetting, self-extinction: one emerges from such dangerous exercises in self-mastery 
as a different person, with a few more question marks, above all with the will 
henceforth to question further, more deeply, severely, harshly, evilly, and quietly than 
one had previously questioned. The trust in life is gone: life itself has become a 
problem. (pp. 6-7) 
 
What Nietzsche seems to be concerned with in this passage is not unknowing as an outward-
facing state of being which allows us only to know the limits of what we should know but, in 
fact, the surrender of our own self-certainties, which would include this knowing of what not 
to know. I would argue that this more expansive conception of ‘unknowing’ (if we were to 
keep the name) that Nietzsche outlines here could profitably problematise and develop what 
Smith says about the ‘well-stocked mind’, and the epistemic state reflected in the anecdotes 
Smith provides to illustrate his account of the experience or practice of unknowing: 
 
The psychotherapist who resists her clients’ demands for answers and solutions, since 
she both understands as a matter of theory and senses from everyday professional 
experience that ‘answers’ are no help at all but the patience to live with the lack of 
them in some quite mysterious way is. The university tutor who says of his (well 
regarded) seminars: ‘I just try to be there for the students, it seems to work somehow, 
I don’t really understand why’. Any conversation in which we don’t know where it’s 
going, where it would be quite wrong to steer it, to direct it. A man who, becoming a 
father for the first time, read some of the available books on fatherhood and said that 
the best ones encouraged him simply to be with his son, to become attuned to him, 
to live with the mystery that is another person. (p. 277) 
 
These anecdotes could be seen to express the opposite of what I have argued that Nietzsche 
proposes. Instead of putting knowledge or a sense of what ‘works’ or is ‘good’ and ‘true’ in to 
question, they show a lack of Nietzschean distrust. The practical, experiential, or immediate 
knowledge, and the knowledge of what is not worth knowing, expressed in these anecdotes, 
would not, without the development I suggest, fully support Smith’s claim of their association 
with a Nietzschean unknowing. The psychotherapist utilises negative ignorance in the service 
of a professional knowledge which determines exactly what should and should not be known. 
The university tutor’s knowledge may be unreflective or unarticulated but is produced by 
experience, intuition and feedback from students who engage in his ‘well regarded’ practice 
- the fact that it is ‘well-regarded’, being itself a form of knowledge and affirmation. However, 
the seeming absence of reflection and self-criticality, implied by Smith, means that this tutor’s 
practice is somewhat removed from Nietzsche’s thought (although may well serve as an 
object of Nietzschean critique, which is what I am arguing). Smith’s conversational example 
suggests that we should allow some conversations to direct us, rather than the other way 
around; however, one would then have to know the difference between which conversations 
(and with which interlocutors) this would be appropriate (perhaps something more 
appropriately revealed by context, rather than by norms). The final anecdote of the father 
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reading and determining the ‘best’ books on fathering (that present a specific course of action 
which one must know) implies not only that the father somehow knows these are the best 
books, because they confirm what he already intuitively ‘knows’, but more problematically, 
that the father-son relation wouldn’t already be conditioned by all sorts of social conventions 
and remembered (and judged to be ‘good’) experiences of the father; the ‘mystery that is 
another person’ being exactly that which forces us back onto knowledge we do have access 
to and can put into action. Smith, then, in all of his examples, is presenting unknowing as a 
form of knowledge, it is only that it is not knowledge in overtly codified and explicit form, and 
instead intuitive, tacit, and experiential knowledge. While such a position is certainly 
defensible, its dynamic is significantly elaborated by the further educational research I have 
attempted to provide in the Nietzschean and post-Nietzschean critical trajectories that Smith 
utilises to make his argument.  
Smith’s reading of Derrida, via John D. Caputo (who, it must be noted, is one of the 
more prominent Derrida scholars to have been heavily criticized in Derrida studies; see, for 
example Hägglund 2011 and Schrijvers 2016), does not go far enough in representing 
Derrida’s thought in this context. Smith tells us that  
 
Derrida is impressed by the thought that other people are more obscure to us than 
we readily suppose, and that we are barely knowable to ourselves—or perhaps that 
in our tendencies to self-deception, wishful thinking and other evasive strategies we 
are particularly unknowable to ourselves. (p. 281) 
 
It is conceivable that Smith’s brief gloss on Derrida here is to provide a stronger justification 
for why in some instances we should not aim at knowledge. This interpretation of Smith’s 
strategy seems justified as he immediately follows this statement by claiming that ‘Many 
psychoanalysts tend to a similar view,’ (p. 281).  ‘simple knowledge’ proving obstructive to 
the patient (p. 281). This approach of it being ‘better not to know’, or giving priority to what 
we don’t know, does not quite capture Derrida’s perspectives on these issues. Derrida tells 
us, in Of Grammatology, that his style (like Georges Bataille and Maurice Blanchot’s before 
him) ‘is affected by nonknowledge as by its future and it ventures out deliberately.’ (p. 162). 
This venture is marked by ‘the departure from the closure of a self-evidence’, which, of course 
would include the knowledge of that which it is better not to know, indicated in Smith’s 
anecdotal examples of unknowing. As an aside, Smith’s rejection of a sometimes promiscuous 
and arbitrary relation to knowledge (p. 276) seems a little too dismissive of what I would 
suggest are some of the fundamental tenets of post-Nietzschean (and – it is also arguable, 
although I will not have the space to do so – post-Socratic and post-Freudian) thought. Why 
should one not learn from several (possibly contradictory) sources? And more to the point, 
how could one avoid doing so? 
Attending carefully to ‘the facile ideas about relativism’ (p. 276) that Smith dismisses, as 
perhaps including advanced forms of epistemic justification such as coherentism (see Alcoff 
1996), might provide an even stronger, more ethical, and rigorous understanding of what 
unknowing – and, its perhaps sharper and more clearly actionable as well as less mistakenly 
virtuous formulation: not knowing – might have to offer research and teaching in philosophy 
of education and education studies. This expanded understanding of ‘unknowing’ or ‘not 
knowing’ might see that unknowing is no, or not just, an outward-facing virtue, concomitant 
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with the ‘right’ knowledge of a ‘well-stocked mind’, which allows one to decide or ‘sense’ 
what is and is not worth knowing. It is instead, or as well, the putting in to question of the 
legitimacy of what one thinks one knows.  
A helpful way of understanding just what is involved in this understanding of ‘not knowing’ 
and of its educational significance comes from Barbara Johnson’s discussion of ignorance.  In 
her essay, ‘Teaching Ignorance: L’Ecole des Femmes’, Johnson (1989) distinguishes between 
two types of ignorance relevant to education and educational research. Negative ignorance, 
which is the conscious or unconscious repression of some knowledge, often in favour of other 
knowledge, and positive ignorance, which is the putting into question of, and sometimes 
moving on from, the knowledge we think we have. Neither of these forms of ignorance are 
necessarily good or bad in and of themselves. In fact, Johnson argues that, ’negative 
ignorance may be the necessary by-product – or even the precondition – of any education 
whatsoever’ and that ‘positive ignorance [is] the pursuit of what is forever in the act of 
escaping, the inhabiting of that space where knowledge becomes the obstacle to knowing – 
that is the pedagogical imperative we can neither fulfil nor disobey.’ (p. 85). However, this of 
course does not mean that there are not more and less good ways to utilise and experience 
these forms of ignorance. My above analysis suggests that Smith’s conception of ‘unknowing’ 
only utilises negative ignorance, thus risking association with its repressive tendencies, while 
at the same time neglecting the conditioning of knowledge which stifles the work of positive 
ignorance.  I would argue that a consideration of these points opens up important critical 
perspectives on education and on the role of philosophy of education in learning, teaching 
and research. Specifically: perhaps philosophers need to consider the possibility that a 
valuable epistemological practice for education would be one that puts less emphasis on 
knowing (including knowing what not to know), and more emphasis on putting into question. 
The putting into question of the legitimacy of what one knows is how Socrates, Friedrich 
Nietzsche, Sigmund Freud, and Jacques Derrida, and most of their interpreters, certainly 
those I cite below, would be more likely to conceive of what could be called unknowing. In 
contrast, the attempt to control both what is worth knowing and what is not worth knowing 
could – despite the important merits that Smith outlines – too easily be aligned with the remit 
of the conservative or overbearing educator, whose aim it is to uphold a particular vision of 
what the educated person should look like. Non-knowledge, or the kind of disposition of 
unknowing that Smith advocates can, for some educators, be a convenient excuse for 
unethical action, inaction, or exclusion. Equally, being secure in one’s knowledge, especially 
from a position of privilege and/or in education, has been shown to repress and exclude forms 
of knowledge and being that might undermine or contradict one’s own. Notably, feminist, 
queer, and decolonial theory are still at work to undo this self-certainty. Smith’s seemingly 
nostalgic nod to the ’time when it was thought that a principal purpose of education was to 
help the student to acquire—to build, to understand the value of having [a well-stocked 
mind]’ (p. 276), doesn’t, understandably but problematically, attend to the often inherent – 
and certainly by means of ‘unknowing’ exclusion – sexist, racist, anti-queer, colonial and 
classist mentality that historically shaped and was shaped by educators in these and our 
times. This is, of course, still the case, which leads to the point that the idea of the ‘well-
stocked mind’ and all its ideological baggage should be subject to the critique and operation 
of ‘not knowing’, rather than saddled too comfortably alongside it. 
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Ignorance Against Unvirtuous Knowledge 
 
Some things are obviously not true but were (and regrettably still are, by some people) 
taught to be true. Often false claims of knowledge are used to support those in power, or give 
some power over others. False ‘knowledge’ can also be used to support irrational hatred. 
Examples of false knowledge that has long been proved (through experience, science, and 
logical reflection) to be the product of these causes rather than any truth include: the idea 
that there is a divine right of kings – i.e. that God has put a particular monarch in place to 
rule; that there are innate differences of ability between different genders or ‘races’; that 
homosexuality is the product of mental illness; that there is no such thing as climate change. 
Apart from the divine right of kings, there are still those who make these false claims to 
knowledge, without epistemic legitimacy. The effects of these false claims to knowledge also 
continue to structure our society and therefore these knowledge claims require continual de-
legitimation, both within education and society more generally. The effects themselves are 
also subject to important challenges, not least through education, legal action, and social and 
political activism. 
The work of Walter Mignolo, especially as presented in his book, The darker side of 
western modernity: Global futures, decolonial options, offers great assistance in the 
conceptualisation and critique of received approaches to knowledge and knowing; an 
approach arguably expressed, for example, by Smith’s nostalgic desire for the ‘virtue’ of the 
‘well-stocked mind’. Mignolo (2011) explains that, 
 
Subjectively, the modern/colonial matrix of knowledge (e.g., coloniality of knowledge) 
has been created, perfected, transformed, expanded, exported/imported by a 
particular kind of social agent: in general (and we can go through the biographer of 
the great thinkers and scientists in the Western canon), they were male, they were 
Christians, they were white, and, as we said, they lived in Western Christendom, 
which, after the sixteenth century, was translated into Europe. That is to say: the 
modern/colonial matrix of knowledge has been linked to a kind of subjectivity 
emerging from the lived experience of white and Christian males who lived and 
studied in [Italy, Spain, Portugal, France, Germany, and England, and their languages]. 
(p.  112) 
 
In terms of both Johnson and Smith’s concepts, we could read the ‘modern/colonial matrix of 
knowledge’ as being the major example of the conscious operation of negative ignorance or 
(Smith’s) ‘unknowing’, which ‘knows’ and asserts (sometimes through simple exclusion) what 
is and what is not worth knowing. On the other hand, positive ignorance or (Johnson’s) ‘un-
knowing’ (which, as I have argued, Smith does not present an equivalent concept for) provides 
a means to conceptualise a critique of the modern/colonial matrix of knowledge, including its 
effects on our own thinking. Doubling as a prime example of positive ignorance, Johnson 
(1989) puts into question the practice of negative ignorance in education, asking: 
 
Could it be that the pedagogical enterprise as such is always constitutively a project 
of teaching ignorance? Are our ways of teaching students to ask some questions 
always correlative with our ways of teaching them not to ask – indeed, to be 
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unconscious of – others? Does the educational system exist in order to promulgate 
knowledge, or is its main function rather to universalize a society’s tacit agreement 
about what it has decided it does not and cannot know? (pp. 76-77) 
 
These are, I argue, crucial questions for the future of learning, teaching, and research in 
philosophy of education and education studies. No doubt, some of the best resources we 
have to combat the undesirable effects of negative ignorance, as well as judging when it might 
be a good idea to utilise it consciously, can be found in the academic study of education. As 
such, we might ask, what are the ways the concepts of negative and positive ignorance might 
be used to help us think about education? And what different forms of education might they 
apply to? Mass education (e.g. schooling and university)? Individual educational experiences, 
in and out of institutions? Education through media (e.g. news, social media)? 
Negative ignorance is the conscious or unconscious repression of some knowledge, 
often in favour of other knowledge. A classic example here is Charles Mills’ account of “white 
ignorance” which, rather than acting as “the passive obverse to knowledge” actually functions 
actively to present itself as knowledge, while simultaneously suppressing other forms of 
knowledge (see Mills, White Ignorance, in Sullivan and Tuana, 2007 pp. 13-14). Accordingly, 
we might also ask what kind of knowledge does schooling consciously or unconsciously 
repress? What aren’t we taught? How might looking at what we are taught help us to think 
about what schooling is trying to avoid, as well as what it is trying to do? Which social and 
cultural forms of knowledge are privileged in education and society? Which aren’t? Does mass 
education seem to work to dramatically change society, or basically keep it the same? Or both 
in different ways? How might thinking about negative ignorance, and consciously or 
unconsciously repressed knowledge help us to answer the questions above? 
Equally, a positive ignorance is the putting into question of, and sometimes moving on 
from, the knowledge we think we have, and asking where it might be just or helpful to do so. 
It might be especially useful to developing our own ways of looking at ourselves and engaging 
with the world, as well as in academic (including scientific) research, and questioning how 
education operates and what it seems to take for granted in various contexts, as well as 
looking at what seems to be valued (often without question) in society. In an interview with 
Barbara Johnson, published in The Wake of Deconstruction (1994), she explains that 
 
It's not as if I think life is simple, so I retreat into literature so as to find the difficulty 
that I crave! I think, on the contrary, that life is extremely complex, and a literature 
that tries to work on what the nature of that complexity is interests me as a way of 
thinking about the difficulty life presents. So much of the indoctrination we get in the 
socialization process implies that everything should be simple. We should just love 
each other; men should just take care of the children half the time; that would be 
simple. What is it that resists those simple solutions that we all say we believe in? 
That's what I'm interested in, that kind of persistence of resistances to the simplicity 
that our ideology bombards us with as that which we fall short of through seemingly 
accidental fault. (pp. 98-99) 
 
This disposition of simplicity that Johnson is perturbed by has striking similarities to Smith’s 
description of unknowing, especially as expressed through his anecdotes (not least that 
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describing the father-son relationship). The critical approach that Johnson endorses might be 
a useful addition to Smith’s reflections. Although Johnson does not state it explicitly, positive 
ignorance is a particularly good example of this ‘persistence of resistances’, challenging, as it 
does, unquestioned virtues, such as that of ‘the well-stocked mind’. In contradistinction to 
Smith’s presentation of ‘unknowing’, Johnson (1989), through a reading of the Phaedrus, 
makes received knowledge the subject of critique, rather than the object of possession or 
aversion: 
 
Up to now we have been viewing the teaching of ignorance in a purely negative light, 
a repressive method of instructing the student not to know. What Socrates seeks, on 
the other hand, is to teach the student that he does not know. To teach ignorance is, 
for Socrates to teach to un-know, to become conscious of the fact that what one thinks 
is knowledge is really an array of received ideas, prejudices, and opinions – a way of 
not knowing that one does not know. (p. 84) 
 
This ‘way of not knowing’ is not a state of being, like Smith’s conception of it, wherein what 
is and is not worth knowing has already been determined (at least within a specific time and 
a specific culture), it is instead a means of putting into question what one thinks one knows.  
 
Education Studies and Educational Research: putting positive ignorance and unknowing to 
work 
  
Adopting an epistemological position along the lines articulated here may shed new 
light on the ways we engage with education and the teaching and research of education, 
particularly in the context of “education studies” courses. The questions we already – and 
might continue to – put to ourselves and our students might then include: What do you know? 
What have you been taught? What have you learned, either from that teaching or from other 
experience? What experiences outside formal education have you learned things from? Does 
knowledge you have sometimes seem contradictory? Do things other people seem to know 
sometimes contradict what you think you know? What don’t you know? What haven’t you 
been taught? What might be the reasons for not teaching something that could provide 
knowledge? Is some knowledge possibly dangerous in the ‘wrong’ hands? Might some 
knowledge challenge or undermine what many consider a ‘good’ society to be? Is it 
sometimes better, or even just ‘easier’, not to know something? Should we question what we 
do and do not teach? Should we question our teachers? Are there things that are not taught 
that should be? Are there things that are taught that shouldn’t be? How might selective 
teaching keep us ignorant about certain things? Can this ignorance be positive or negative? 
And, who decides? Should we question what we think we know? Are there some things we 
think we know that are more certain than others? What provides knowledge with legitimacy? 
Our own experience? The trust we have in our teachers, scientists and other authority figures 
(compared, for example, with what some politicians or tabloid newspapers say)? What other 
people say and do? It’s seeming logical coherence? A combination of all of these? 
The tireless operation of positive ignorance is anything but an ‘anything goes’ 
relativism and is much closer to advanced forms of coherentism. While it would no doubt 
imply that truth is, in Linda Martin Alcoff’s terms, ‘plural and changeable’, it would not make 
 
This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Bojesen, E. (2019). Positive Ignorance: 
Unknowing as a tool for education and educational research. Journal of Philosophy of Education 
52(4), which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9752.12342. This 
article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions 
for Use of Self-Archived Versions. 
it any less important, or any less the subject of urgent and ongoing epistemological work in 
philosophy of education and education studies. As Alcoff (1996) claims: 
 
…truth is best understood as indexed to a set of specifics, which include not only what 
we can see from a given time and place, but where our thinking is at any given 
moment, as well as the relevant features of reality. This makes truth both plural and 
changeable, since it is relative to a context richly conceived. But it does not make truth 
arbitrary or subjective: given sufficiently specifiable contextual ingredients the 
determination of truth can be objective, in some cases perhaps even conforming to a 
deductive-normological method. The so-called subjective elements – the interpretive 
schema of knowers, their horizons of understanding, the historically specific episteme 
– are never sufficient to establish truth. Truth becomes apparent when beliefs and 
practices cohere within a lived reality. (p. 211) 
 
If this coherentist conception of truth were to be applied to the future of education studies, 
then then the field could easily be defined as extending to the study of all beliefs and 
practices, and their relative coherence or non-coherence with a lived reality: How have we 
learned them and what are their effects? Do they cohere with reality? And can we go about 
unknowing them if they don’t? Would these questions not then also put philosophy of 
education at the heart of education studies? And wouldn’t education studies then be justified 
in situating itself as asking fundamental questions relevant to all disciplines and, in the 
process, indicate that philosophy of education is anything but a second order discipline? 
Could – using the limited scope of this essay as an example – the location of practices 
productive of negative ignorance and the application of positive ignorance provide theoretical 
means for exploring and developing highly topical research and study questions in subjects 
ranging from technology to social justice (of course, not implying that these do not intersect)?  
 First and foremost –and as this paper has attempted to do – positive ignorance can be 
put to work against claims made in philosophy of education.  
Unknowing, then, while not necessarily a ‘quieter epistemic [virtue]’ (p. 275), might 
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